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I NT T R 0 D U C T

There

is

perhaps no principle

in

0 N.

law,upon which the courts

are more uniformly agreed than that of res gestae. Yet the
application of the principle is so varied,and the decisions
so conflicting,that an attempt to reconcile them seems,in
many cases hopeless.
If we determine how the phrase originated trace
its history,and the various meanings of which it is susceptible;we shall be able to understand more clearly the conplel
manner with which the courts have dealt with it
deduce

common principles

,and possibly

which will be of future value,in re-

storing order to the present uncertain condition of the rules
of evidence relating

to our subject.

Origin and Development.
This phrase,in one form or another,res gesta,res

actares

gos-

tae,was familiar in classical Latin literature,as one may see
by reference to any Latin dictionary. The phrase res acta is
most often found now in
alios;thou71h

the phrase res acta inter

the terms were once used interchangably

tain extent.(3
stance

our law in

Dane's

Abridgement,530

(1823)). The first

discovered of the use of the term in

red in Home Tookes trial

to a

for high treason.(

cerin-

English law occur25 Iowells State

Trials,444 (1794). In which the counsel for the government,in
commenting during a legal discussion as to the propriety of
the examination of a witness by Erskine,for the defence,as to
the reasons why a certain proposal made by one society was not
accepted by the other. A letter

stating the reasons for de-

clining the propositions had been received in evidence. Garrow
for the government objected to the stating

of the reason on

the ground that Tooke was not a member of the society,and the
letter

must

speak

received .........

for itself:

"That letter

your lordships have

probably upon the ground,that as it is an

answer to an act which is

charged against the prisoner,it

is

fit to be received as part of the res gesta upon the subject".
The expression

is

v.1-ardy 24 Howells

not used again until

1801,although

State Trials,199 at page 453.)

Lord

in

( R
Chief

"In the cases of

Justice Eyre says:

Damaree and Lord George

Gordon the cry of the mob at the time made

a part of the

fact,of the transaction." This is the thing itself which in
days we style the res gesta. The phrase

later

Hoare v.Allen 3 Esp.276
evidence

in

where Lord Kenyon lets

(1801)

over objection,on

is next found in

the ground that

certain

some of the

judges on a motion for a new trial,had thought it part of the
res gesta.

It

first

the plural

form which is

now

counsel often and the court once speak of the res gestae.

The first

trace

found of it

the case of Bartlett
in

used in

Avison v.Lord Kinnaid,6 East 188,(1805) where

so universal,in
the

is

in

this

country was in

v.Delprat,4 1ass.702 (1808)

arguing for the plaintiff,against

Mass.in

when Mr Story

the admission of certain

declarations,gives the classes of cases

in

which declarations

are admissibleand gives one class to be those, "declarations
forming part of the res gestae,"citing the case of Avison v.
Kinnaid. The court however does not use the expression in this
case.
Time will not permit as caref,.d an historical examination of
the term as might be wished. Enough has been said however to
show that the phrase was fairly recognized in the law of evidence at the beginning of the century. There are however signs
that it was not always regarded with Vavur. In the first edition of Phillips on

evidence published in 1814,he said:

4.
"Hearsay is often admitted in evidence as part of the res

ges-

ta; the meaning of which seems to be that where it is necessary ..........

to inquire into the nature of a particular act,

and the intention of the person who did the act,proof of what
the person said at the time of doing it is adnissible evidence for the purpose of showing its nature and character."
He struck this phrase out of his fourth edition,(1819) substituting the

english word "transaction," this he continued to

use until associated with Ilr.Amos he published his eight edition,in 1838,in that edition he placed the Latin term in the
plural formres gestae,and it has remained there since.
Starkie published his work in 1824,and has always used the
phrase res gestae,as have Greenleaf,Taylor,and Wharton;while
Stephens dispenses with it entirely in his digest of evidence.
Having examined briefly into the origin of the phrase it
would be interesting as well as profitable to know just what
called it into use. This seems to be more a matter of speculation than positive knowledge.

One writer accounts for its

origin on account of its "convenient obscurity.

"

At the end

of the last century there was an attempt to unify the rules of
evidence instead of leaving them as questions of usage for the
various localities where they might arise. This was assisted
by reporting cases at

nisi prius,made as the compiler of one

3.

tells us in his preface,to preserve the rulings in points of
evidence,-formerly only to be learned "by close and constant
attendance at nisi prius."

The law of hearsay evidence being

at that time unsettled the lawyers seem to have caught at the
term res gestae. This phrase seemed thereafter to serve for
the same thing which heretofore had been expressed by the
term,-"the transaction,"

"the fact."

They did not stop to an-

alyze closely the application of the term. Somethings were evidently placed under this head because of the convenience it
afforded in getting around a difficult

question. The plural

phrase soon transplanted the singular. The more indefinite
they made it the more easy it became to enlarge and unsettle
its scope.
This seems to be the most satisfactory explanation of
its origin which has been found. That this was a dangerous expedient lawyers of the present day have ample proof by the
ever increasing vagueness and uncertainty of the expression.
To

show the

amiss to
to the

"convenient obscurity of the phrase it may not be

quote some of the meanings which have been applied
phrase. Prof.Thayer gives the following as some of the

meanings which most readily suggest themselves. In the common
plural form it may mean either:

"(a) a conception which limits

the term res gestae to the ultimate facts in the case,-to a

fact in issue; (b) one which extends it to any evidentiary fact:
and then using the term in either of these two ways.

l.That

of a single fact,an event,a transaction,of which a declaration
may be a part,-pars rei gestaeas the phrase sometimes is;2.
That of the details which go to constitute this single whole;
3.That of several distinct facts,eventstransactions,going to
make up a larger composite whole,e.g.,the notion of the particulars of a business or a piece of business intrusted to an
agent or a series of connected transactions covered by a consriracy;

4.

That of the one composite whole so made up; 5.That

of evidentiary or illustrative facts of concomitant circumstances,or "surrounding circumstances" as distinguished from
the central fact thus

surrounded or attended; 6. That of a

total whole embodying the central fact with its entire bulk of
circumstances; 7.That of a central fact and some of its surroundings,e.g.,such of them as are relevant or material to the
given inquiry."

Modern Application.
The courts now generally agree in their application of the
doctrine that res gestae denotes the "transaction" constituting the fact in issue,or deemed relevant theryeto,-the "act to
"the fact in
be proved, I'-

question, "-"those surrounding circum-

stances which relate to and illustrate

the principle fact and

its necessary or usual incidents "-and sometimes other phrases
or terms are used in defining it. Prof. Chase says: "Declarations (or acts) forming part of such "transaction"are deemed
competent evidence,because they serve to illustrate its charac.ter,show the motive which occasioned itexhibit its nature,object or purpose,explain its origin or signifigance,show the
relations of the parties concerned therein etc." In the case
of Beaver v.Taylor 1 Wall.at p, 6 42. Mr Justice Swayne says:
"It

is,perhaps not posirble to lay down any general rule as to

what is part of the res gestae which will be decisive in every
case in which it may be presented by the varying phrases of
human affairs. The judicial mind will always be compelled frequently to apply the general principle and deduce the proper
conclusion." Perhaps the most common and largest class of
cases in which declarations are admissible,is that in which
the state of mired or motive with which any particular act is
done is the subject of inquiry. Thus the mere assembling of a

8.
mob does not disclose their
made their

purpose,but

the cries

intention plain and upon such evidence

of the mob
treason

could be proved. (Lord George Gordons case,2, Howells

State

Trials 520). But if the declarations are made subsequent and
are merely narrative of the previous occurrence they are liable to be influenced by subsequent occurrences. They depend
for their reliability wholly upon the memory and reliability
of the witness. (Waldele v.N.Y.C.& H.R.R.CO.,95 N.Y.274.)

Upon

an indictment for abortion the woman upon whom the abortion
was attempted being dead,the prosecution proved that she went
away in a buggy,returned in the night,and told a witness what
had been done and said to her by the doctor who performed the
operation upon the

alleged procurement of the defendant.This

evidence being objected to on the part of the defendant. The
Court of Appeals,Grover J.writing the opinion said: "In this
case the thing done or
another townand it
ed was no part
performance

"es gestae,was the doctors office at

is clear that its narration by the deceas-

of the thing.

Anything said accompanying the

of an act,explanatory

thereof,or

showing its

pur-

pose or intention when material is competent as part of the
act. But when the declarations offered are merely narrations
of past occurrences they are incompetent. This is precisely
this

case.

The declarations given

in

evidence

were a mere

staternnt of what had been done at the doctors office,and not
any part

of what was then done,and therefore not part

res gestae."

of the

And the court further said: "The length of time

between the act and its subsequent narration by one of the
actors I do not regard as material. The question is ,did the
proposed declaration accompany the act,or was it so

connected

therewith as to constitute a part of it? If so it is a part of
the res gestae and competentotherwise
50 N.Y.95.)

not."

(People v.Davis,

"The declaration of a person who is

wounded and

bleeding,that the defendant has stabbed her,made immediately
after the occurrence,though with such an interval of time as
to allow her to go from her own room up

stairs into another

room is admissible in evidence after her death as part of the
res gestae."(Peo.v.McPike,3 Cush.181). This is a very extreme
case,no authorities being cited to support it.

The opinion of

the court seems to rest on the closing sentence which is as
follows:

"In testimony of this character,much must be left to

the exercise of the sound discretion of the presiding judge."
Later decisions change this broad position materialy,leaving
less to the discretion of the court. In(Lund v.Tyngsborough,
9 Cush. 36.)

the court

said: "When

the act of a party may be giv-

en in evidence,his declarations made at the time,and calculated to elucidate

and explain the character

and quality of the

10.
act,and so

connected with it as to constitute one transaction,

and so as to derive credit from the acts itself,are admissible in evidence. The credit which the act or fact gives to th
accompanying
explain

a part

declarations as

the particular

of the transaction to
class of declara-

fact uistinguish this

tions from mere hearsay; "and further: "Such a declaration derives credit

and importance as forming a part of the transactis

ion itself,and

included in

the

surrounding

circumstances

which may always be given in evidence to the jury with the prin
ciple fact. There must be a main or principle fact or transaction and only such declarations are admissible as grow out
of the principle transaction,illustrate its character,are contempoary with itand derive some degree of #rbdit from it."
In (

Com.v. Backett,2 Allen 136.)

a witness testified that,at

the moment the fatal stabs were given,he he-ard the victim cry
out; "I

ar

stabbed, "and he at

once went to him and reached him

within twenty seconds after that,and then heard him say;I am
stabbed,-I am gone-Dan Hackett stabbed me."

This evidence was

held admissible. The court characterizing it as,"an explanation or

statement contempoary with,the same transaction,form-

ing a material

and natural part

of it,and

competent

original evidence in the nature of res gestae."

as being

and in (Wald-

ele v.R.R.CO. supra) the last two cases are favorably comment-

12.
ed upon and adopted as the rule by the court. The
in

(Brownell v.Pacific R.R. Co.,47 M0.239.)

court said

"The next question

is in relation to the admission of the declaration of Brovmell. The accidnet happened in consequence of a switch being
left open on the defendants track. There is no dispute or controversey about the fact that the switch was left open. Immvediately after the accidentwhen Brownell was restored to

consi-

cousness,and just before he died,he said:.... "If it had not
been for the man who left the switch open, "This was objected
to,but the objection was overruled and the testimony admitted.
As a dying declaration it was clearly inad.issible,for the
modern decisions Clearly establish the doctrine that the rule
permitting dying declarations to be given in evidence applies
exclusively to

criminal prosecutions for felonious homicides,

and has no reference to civil cases. But every declaration of
a deceased person is

not rejected on this

principle.

Where a

declaration is made by a deceased person,contemporaneously or
nearly so,with a main event,by whose consequence it is alleged
he &ied,as

to the cause of that event,thougl

larations must be

,eneraly the dec-

contemporaneous with the event,yet where

there are any connecting circumstances they may,even when mrad
sometime afterwards form a part of the whole res gestae. The
declaration of Brownell,in reference to the

switchgrew direct-

12.
ly out of and was made directly after the happening of the
fact. 1o one would hesitate to act on such evidence in his
own concerns. It was so intimately connected that it made a
part of the transaction itself,and I think clearly came within
the doctrine of res gestae."
Directly contrary to this case is that of the Cleveland Columbus and Cincinnati R.R.CO.v.Mara,26 Ohio ST. 185. The evidence in

this

case

showed that Mrs Mlaras injuries

were occas-

ioned by her falling or being precipitated,from the steps or
platform of the car into the cattle guards,and there was evidence tending to
den start

show that this was causea by a "jerk" or sud-

of the train

the officers

carelessly and wrongfuly permitted by

of the company.

Her husband while on the stand

had described the manner of her injury,and that he was a step
or so behind her when the injury occurred,and that he stepped
right to her and a man named Nash came immediately
Counsel for plaintiff

then asked the following question:

"While you and Nash were in
of the cattle

and if

the act of getting your wife out

guard,iimmediately

ask her how she

after.

after

the accidentdid

came to be there; did she make answer to

so what was it?"

she came to be thrown in

Mr Nash
it,

Witness replied:"Nash asked her how
there,and she told him she was jerked

off while in the act of getting off the cars."

13.

On review the supreme court said: "We think the court erred in
admitting proof of what was said by Mrs 1ara as to the cause
of her fall or precipitation into the ditch of the cattle
guard. Although occurring immodiately after the accident,it
was no part of the res gestae,but a narration of a past transaction,and therefore mere hearsay evidence."
It seems impossible to reconcile the two decisions.Certainly applying the test to the latter case which the court applied in the Brownell casethe evidence would be admissible.
The Ohio court does not discuss the subject at all or give any
basis for its decision,more than is given above. It is an extreme case and not in line with the leading American or English cases. These cases are so similar that they are of special interest,as showing the contrariety of doctrine in different courts.
(Insurance Co.,v.Mosley 8 Wall.397.) Was an action on a policy of insurance. The question was as to whether the deceased,
Mosley came to his death by an accident inflicting personal
injury,or whether he died from disease. To prove that his
death was caused by injury inflicted by accident,his wife and
son testifiedthat he had left his bed in the night,that when
he came back he said he had been hurt,by falling down stairs.
He died a short time thereafter,and his death was supposed

to

14.
have been caused by the accident. The court in review held the
evidence was not admissible as dying declarationsbut held
that

they were properly received as part

of the res gestae.

Swayne J.in his opinion says: "In the complexity of human affairswhat
neither

is done and what is said are often so related that

can be detached without leaving the residue

tary and distorted.
but

there is

no

There may be fraud and falsehood in
grolnd of objection

exist equally in

the other.

controling member from a
context..........

To reject

the verbal

sentence,or
Where

principle

subject of inquiry,the

principle

fact.

to

show the reality

acter.

fact would

as to strike

out the

the controling

sentence

sickness of affection is

the

sickness or affection is the

The res gestae are the declarations tending
of its

existence and its

extent and char-

The tendency of recent adjudications is to extend rath-

er than narrow the scope of the doctrine.
its

both;

to the one that does not

not unfrequently have the same effect

from its

fragmen-

application

practical

thef'e is

Rightly guarded in

no principle

in

the law of

evidence more safe in its results. There is none which rests
on a more

solid

basis of reason and authority.

We think it

was

properly applied in the court below. In the ordinary concerns
of life

no one would doubt the truth

of these declarations,or

15.
hesitate to regard them uncontradicted as concl-sive. Their
probative force would not be questioned. Unlike much other evidence equally cogent for all the p -;rposes of moral convictions,they ha ve the sanction of law as well as reason. The
want of this concurrence in the law islften to be regretted.
The weight of reflection,is increased by the fact that what
w- s said could not be received as "dying declarations,"althougi,
the person who made it was dead,and hence could not be called
as a witness. "In this case as reported there was nothing to
show how long an interval

elapsed between the injury and the

declarations. From the circumstances it woald seem to have
been at least five minutes. Though the

court speaks of the dec-

laration as being made "very soon after the fall."
a strong dissenting opinion in this

There was

case by Justice Clifford

concurred in by Justice Nelson,anL the

case has been

much

criticised. It is quite possible that to meet out abstarct
justice,the court in this case, disregarded or at least unduly strained the general well settled rules of utidence. However this may be the case must be regarded as going to one extreme,while Bedingfields

case,(14 Cox's Criminal Cses 341.)

goes equaly to the other. Bedingfield was indicted for the
murder of a widow named Buddwith whom he had intimate relations. He had threatened to cut her throat. She was a laund-

16.
ress,and had,in her business,two

women assistants. On tne

morning of her death,the accused came to her house earlier
than usual,and they were together in a room for some time.He
went outand she was found by one of the assistants 2yinig senseless on the floor. He went to a shop,and bought some spirits,which he carried back to

the room where Mrs Rudd was,both

of the assistants being at the time in the yard. "In a minute
or two the deceased came suddenly out of the house towards the
women with her throat cut,and meeting one of them said something pointing backwards
dead."At

the trial

the counsel

ing speech proposed to
said as

to the house.In a few moments
for the prosecution in

she was
his open-

state to the jury what the deceased

she came out of the house;but the Chief Justice pre-

vented him,saying substantially that

"he had carefully consid-

ered the question,and was clear that it could not be admitted,
and therefore could not be statedas it might have a fatal

ef-

fect. He regretted that according to the law of England,any
statement made by the deceased should not be admissible.Then
could it be admissiblehaving been made in

the absence of the

prisoner,as part of the res gestae?It is not so admissible,for
it was not part of anything done,but something said after
something done.It was not as if while being in

the room,and

while the act was being done,she had said something. "Later the

17.
counsel

attempted to prove what the deceased

Chief Justice ruled it out,"anything,"

said;but

he said,

the

"uttered

by

the deceased at the time the act was being done would be admissible,as for instance,if she had been heard to say something,as

"don't Harry."

her after
was

it

But here it

was all over,wvhatever

completed."

This case ha ;

was something stated by
it

was,and after

the act

also been much criticised.

Antecedent Declarations.
Antecedent

declarations

gestae.

the

ed in

In

a-e often admitted as part of the res

celebrated Haydeni

case,the prisoner was indict-

Connecticut for the murder of Mary Stannard. The sup-

posed motive being the alleged pregnancy of the deceased,by
Hayden,a married man. The victim was found dead in the woods.
On the hearing evidence was admitted of the declarations of
the deceased,on

the

day of the murder,that

she was pregnant

by

liayden,that she had seen him that day,that he had promised to
get her some medicine and to meet her in the woods that day to
let

her have

it.

In

Reg. v. Wainright,13

Cox's C.C.17;

a murder

case. Lord Chief Justice Cokburn refused to admit evidence of
a declaration

of the

deceasedon

alive as. to where she was going.

the day she was last
lie said:

"It

seen

was only a state-

ment of intention which might or might not have been carried
out. She would have gone any way under any circumstance

.

You

18.
get the fact that on leaving she made a statement,but you must
not go beyond it:

In Kirby v. State,7 Yerg.259,an the trial of

for murder evidence was admitted of the declara-

an indictment

tions of the deceased on the evening before he was missed,
that he was going to the Pine
cave.

The court said:

the reason why

is

part

case:

saltpetre

of the transaction:Explains

the Pine Mountains and constitu-

Elrod was in

tes a fact in the

This declarationmade as it may be

on his way,and explaining the reason of his going,

saidwhile
constitutes
death.

"It

Mountains,to hunt a

an important fact

to elucidate

the

question of his

But a declaration, "shortly before his death,"

that he

had been to the mountairis,and was going out shortly again,was
inadmissible.

There 'vas nothing in

the evidence

ing to charge the prisoner with the murderbut
ment of the deceased.

admitted tendthe mere state-

In Hunter v.State,40 U.J.L.495,536,a

man afterwards murderedmade

statements

to his son,and wrote

a note to his wife,a few hours before leaving home on the
night of the

nurder,to

.

that he was going to the

the effect

city of C.on business,and that the prisoner was going with hiUi.
Held that the
as

explanations

home.
the

statements both oral

The

and preparations

and written were admissible

of the act of going from

court taking occasion to say:

subject,more especially

those in

this

"The

adjudications

on

country,are perplex-

19.
ingly variant. I can readily find judicial rulings by force of
which this testimony would be excluded;but I can as readily
find other rilings of equal weight,that wo-ld sanction its
mission.,, It will

ad-

at once be seen that this branch of the doc-

trine is very difficult to apply. The admission of such statements being much more dangerous than the admission of subsequent or contemporaneous declarations. One so often makes
statements which subsequent events will not justify,though
made :iith the best intentions. The courts are rightly ve.ry
slow in allowing persons to be

convicted of crime by anteced-

ent statements not made under the sanctity of an oath,or with
the privilege of a cross examination. The doctrine of the hayden trial

is an extreme and it wo dd seem dangerous one. No

one saw Hayden and the girl together in the woods. It is possible she might have maae up her mind to commit suicide and
for some real or fancied wrong desired to charge her death to
Hayden,or might it

not be possible she had made an appoint-

ment with Hayden,and failing

to meet him,and overcome by the
seen no

report oi

alloyed room for the truth of either

of the

sense of her shame committcd suicide.
the case but what

I have

above suppositions. Such being the case aught hLumn

life to :ja

placed in jeopardy by the admission of such testimony'? In the
case of Wainright,supra,the court f, lly recognizes the uncertainty of antecedent statements for it

says:

"she might not

"0.
have
cases

carried out her intentions.
(supr: ) the

statement

is

"

In

the Kirby and Hunter

nade explanatory,or

in

prepara-

tion for the subsequent act,the act tends to corroborate the
antecedent
is

statement,and the danger in

lessened.

Lut

in

admitting

the Uayd'.n case there

aas no

the evidence
evidence b:lt

the bare statement of the deceased, either that there was an
intended meeting in

the woodsor if

that it actualy took place. It
which aill

not rely for its

is

it

had been agreed upon,

impossible to frame

enforcement

to

a rule

some extent on the

discretion of the court.
But would not it

insure greater

safety to demand before

antecedent declarations are admitted as evidence,that they
should be corroborated by subsequent events.
TMary

Stannard had been

she said they were
the murderwhat

seen in

which antecedent

the woods together at the time

a strong corroborative

But some will

Hayden and

to be there,although no one saw him commit

been,and how much credence
ment.

If

it

say,this

declarations

fact

it

would have

would have given to her statewill

defeat the very object for

are admitted,e.g.,to

supply the

want of better evidence. It would seem that those who

argue

thus have mistaken the object of evidence,which is to assist
a jury to arrive at the truth,and thus render a just

verdict;

not to secure the conviction of the accused at any hazard.

21.
Any system of jurisprudence which allows a conviction on evidence so unsatisfactory in its nature is at fault. To allow a
statement fortelling the happening of an event,to go to a jury
to prove

the event

did happen

legitimate rules of evidence.

as intended

is

straining the

Conclusion.
Enough illustrations have been refered to verify the former
statement,of the lack of uniformity in the application of the
principle. The courts uniformily agree that the declaration
and the act must constitute one transaction or at least be so
closely connected that one gains confirmation from the other.
Yet in each case it must be left to the judicial mind to determine,by applying the proper tests,whether in fact in a given case the two are so closely connected as to constitute one
act or to confirm each other.

It has been seen that the prin-

ciple is but a qualification of the rule that "Hearsay is no
evidence" and is received merely as indicitive of the actual
state of mind of the person using them when they were uttered,
or as words or exclamations accompanying an act which is
issue.

in

What takes declarations constituting res gestae from

the rules governing the admission of hearsay,is the fact of
confirmation and credence they receive from surrounding circumstances.

This leaves much to the discretion of the court.

It is not to be expected that each court will look at the various questions brought before them in the same light. Some
courts have,apparently,been

influenced to extend the doctrine,

because it was a convenient ,,ay to admit evidence inadmissible
as dying declarations,thus possibly rendering abstract justice,

23.
but

seriously unsettling

th,9 general principles which should

govern.
In many cases however the divergance though marked is not
as great as it seems. Sometimes the res gestae or "main fact"
is an independent circumstance,so distinct and clear cutthat
it

is

unnecessary to prove any remarks or

"surrotunding

circum-

stances" to illustrate its character or the motive which prompted it.

In such cases it

is evident that the surrouding cir-

cumstances would not form an essential element of the main
fact.

In other cases the main fact unecplained or qualified

would be of slight

value to the

destroyed his will,the

court.

As where

a testator

had

simple act would not explain whether it

was by accident or intentional. But

if he accompanys the act

with a statement as to his purpose or reason these are of
high value to explain the intention of the act. Or the act
may be so closely connected with
ces which follow or precede it,that

a long chain of circumstanit

may be almost

impossi-

ble to select the res gestae. Such a case was Insurance CO.v.
Mosley,supra. The court holding the res gestae to be not only
the fall

but the physical

ing from R.R.CO.

suffering consequent upon it,judg-

v.1ara,the

Ohio courts would have held that

the fall alone constituted the res gestae,and shut out the
subsequent

statements.

24.
Statements to be admitted should also be free from any selfish,or improrer motive. This although seldom spoken of in the
decisions,undoubtably explains many apparent conflicts. The
statemeent of a person who would be benefitted by changing by a
falsehood the natural inferance which would follow his act,
sufficient time for thought intervening,would naturally have
little weight with a court. Such might be statements of an engineer or conductor of a train which had caused an accident.
On the other hand statements made

where nothing could be

gained by sinister motives,though not immediately accompanying the act,are given great weight.
There are dicta in some cases,to the effect that where
the declaration is made to a person who has full knowledge of
the facts which caused the deceased to make the statement,
they would be admissible when not otherwise.

As in R.R.CO.,

v.Mara. The husband was not out of sight of the wife when the
injury was received,being

near enough to her to have felt the

"jerk" caused by the starting of the train,and being conversant with all the particulars of the accident,could have been
subjected to a cross examination nearly as effective as could
the wife if she had lived. Thus her declaration was merely
corroborative of what the husband could swear to. The court
however did not discuss this point. It is evident that the

25.
element of time is not conclusive if

continuity between the

act and the statement be unbroken.
It

will be seen that when all means have been exhausted

for reconciling the various casesthe decisions in many instances cannot be brought into harmony. It is owing to the nat
ural difficulties,and varied circumstances surrounding each
case. That this confusion exists is to be regretted. In a
branch of the law of evidence of so much importance,and under
which questions are so constantly arising in practice uniformity is much to be desired.

That complete uniformity will be

brought about is doubtful. That reform may be had is clear.
How shall it be accomplished?

In Georgia an attempt is made

to regulate by statute which is as follows. "Declarations ac-

companying an act,or so nearly connected therewith in time as
to be free from all suspicion of devise or after thought,are
admissible in evidence as part of the res gestae.,

(Code of

Georgia § 3373). But it is evident this does not help the
matter. It merely enacts as a statute a settled principle.
It is in the exercise of their discretion where the courts
differ. It is clear then,any reform must corme from the courts,
not from the legialature. This may be brought about by the
courts stating just what facts control their decision in admitting or rejecting evidence in each case.

26.
Whether

it

is

lack of confidence

in

the testirnony;a narrow

idea of what is included in res gestae;

the absence of need

for explanatory statements,or a desire to narrow or extend
the general
real

rule.

conflict

in

Then we could determine whether there was a
the casesor

whether what at first

appears

be a conflict was caused by the different manner of looking
at the same facts.

to

27.
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